UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres’ latest report on the situation in Western Sahara may not readily come across as a knockout blow to Polisario’s statehood aspirations in Western Sahara, owing to its usual diplomatic knack for not overtly offending any of the conflicting parties and its few evocations of a “self-determination referendum” every time it quoted the demands of the Polisario leadership.
When looked at the document more closely, however, both the language adopted, and the recommendations laid out in this annual report on the region constitute a major setback for the Algerian-backed Polisario Front.
Although the document does not explicitly support Morocco’s 2007 autonomy initiative, many of its points echoed the avenues the Moroccan plan previously laid out as the best way out of the decades-long political and diplomatic dispute in the Western Sahara region.
A Rebuke to Algeria
In previous reports Guterres shielded himself from quasi-openly singling out Algeria for its primary responsibility in the creation and the prolongation of the conflict and the stalemate of the political process. The new report however, has introduced language suggesting that the UN chief is no longer mincing his words about Algeria’s status as a full-fledged party to the dispute.
The first noteworthy change signifying that winds are blowing against Algeria is the use of the term “all concerned” as opposed to the “parties” which was the term usually used in previous reports. The use of the term “parties” in previous reports was open to different interpretations and was used by Algeria to shirk its responsibility and continue claiming that it is only an observer to the conflict.
The use of the new language, however, carries a strong political connotation in the sense that the UN admits that all parties, including Algeria and Mauritania, are concerned with the dispute and should participate fully in the political process.
Additionally, there is the use of the phrase “good faith” when referring to the political process. While previous reports from the UNSG stressed that the parties show political will to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, the new report emphasizes that achieving that goal requires “good faith” from all concerned parties. This is a tacit, yet clear, reference to the bad faith that Algeria and the Polisario have shown since the beginning of the political process in 2007.
The report thoroughly shatters Algeria’s claims in paragraph 92, where the UN chief calls on the country, and the separatist front it supports, to let go of their obstructive approach to the dispute.
“To that end, I urge all concerned to approach the facilitation of the process by my Personal Envoy with an open mind, and to desist from preconditions for the political process,” the UN chief says. “In guiding present and future approaches, due consideration should be given to the precedents set by my previous Personal Envoys in the framework of existing Security Council resolutions.”
The paragraph stands out as a clear message to Algeria and Polisario urging them to do away with their obstruction stubbornness and to desist from clinging to an obsolete approach that was once contemplated by the United Nations.
To put it bluntly, Guterres has sent a subtly clear message that a referendum of self-determination with the option of independence is off the table and that they can no longer claim that the Security Council resolution 690 of 1991 should be the basis on which the parties should build their negotiations.
The UNSG calls for giving consideration to the changes and precedents set by his previous personal envoys, which is reflected in the language used by the Security Council since the outset of the political process in 2007. Guterres implies that the resolutions adopted during the tenure of his previous Personal Envoys are the only guiding principle for achieving a mutually acceptable political solution.
The new language introduced by Guterres conveys a direct rebuke to Algeria who, following the adoption of Resolution 2602 in October 2021, published a communique in which it rejected the approach taken by the Security Council.
Algeria called on the Personal Envoy to “strictly inscribe” his mandate in the implementation of Resolution 690 on the settlement plan accepted by the “two parties to the conflict.” The Algerian position clearly deviated from the parameters of the political process, which helped clarify that the provisions of Resolution 690 were no longer the best guiding principle for the parties to settle the dispute.
The self-determination referendum off the table
The introduction of this new language clearly indicates that the UN has once and for all closed the chapter for a referendum on self-determination. Some observers who still read the conflict through the lenses of the 80s and 90s might argue that there is nothing in the text suggesting that the UN is repudiating that option.
The first indicator against that claim comes at the end of paragraph 91, where Guterres cites the resolutions that the political solution must be built on, notably mentioning the ones adopted since 2018. “Strong political will is required to find a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with resolutions 2440(2018), 2468 (2019), 2494 (2019), 2548 (2020) and 2602 (2021),” Guterres says in the report.
This paragraph confirms that the resolutions adopted since 2018 are the only legal and political framework within which the parties should strive to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution. More importantly, what gives credence to the new approach is that Resolution 690, which established MINURSO, and all the other resolutions that followed until 1997 were adopted in the absence of a Personal Envoy tasked with bridging the gap between the parties.
The first Personal Envoy was James Baker in 1997, who during his first three years strove to get Morocco and the Polisario to agree on criteria that would pave the way for the holding of a self-determination referendum. Because of the parties’ different interpretation of the settlement provisions and their disagreement on voter eligibility however, the UN had to come to terms with the idea that holding the referendum was an unattainable goal.
In February 2000, the late UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized the lack of means to enforce the result of a referendum, saying “it was time to consider” other ways. Consequently, he asked Baker to “explore ways and means to achieve an early, lasting and agreed resolution.”
Ever since, the dispute has undergone a few shifts and changes and the idea of an autonomy plan as a way to resolve the conflict was floated by Baker for the first time in 2001. While Morocco accepted that proposal, Algeria and Polisario refused it. In 2003, he submitted another proposal, which included an autonomy plan, but also contemplated the holding of a referendum after five years within its implementation. Morocco refused the 2003 proposal while Algeria and the Polisario accepted it.
Following Baker’s resignation in 2004, the Security Council asked the parties to submit proposals to reach a political solution. In the years that followed, the Security Council has moved to regard an agreed and mutually acceptable solution as the only way forward.
Shifts towards a negotiated settlement
This dynamic in favor of a negotiated settlement and the abandonment of a self-determination referendum gained a new momentum when Morocco submitted its autonomy proposal in 2007. The first step that the Security Council took in this direction was resolution 1754 in April 2007, whose adoption was a watershed moment in the history of the conflict’s peace process.
For the first time, the Security Council, called on parties to strive towards finding a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution to the conflict. While it maintained that such a solution would “provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara,” it eliminated the term “referendum.”
This was the first sign that the Security Council regarded a referendum leading to the establishment of an independent state in southern Morocco as an unviable solution that the kingdom could never accept.
Another sign pointing to the abandonment of that option was the fact that Resolution 1754 took note of the Moroccan autonomy plan, stating that it welcomed “serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution.” What was especially significant about that resolution’s wording, pointing to a shift in the Security Council’s approach to the conflict, was the fact that while it “welcomed” Morocco’s efforts it only “took note of” Polisario’s counterproposal.
Resolution 1754 echoes the findings of then Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum. In an interview to El Pais in 2008, he said that the establishment of an independent state in southern Morocco was not realistic. Walsum doubled down in an op-ed published in the same newspaper where he explained that there was widespread consensus within the Security Council about the need to push for a mutually acceptable political solution.
The newly found momentum in favor of a political peace process based on Morocco’s autonomy proposal was dampened following the election of Ban Ki-Moon as Secretary General in 2007 and his subsequent appointment of Christopher Ross as his Personal Envoy. Ross seemed less willing than his predecessor to push Algeria and the Polisario to embrace the new direction taken by the Security Council with the adoption of Resolution 1754.
This enabled both of them to stall the political process by taking the focus away from the political process and focusing instead on human rights in the territory. Despite these attempts, and though no progress was achieved between 2009 and 2017, the Security Council maintained the same emphasis on the need for the parties to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution, with the option of a self-determination referendum being completely off the table.
Renewed momentum under Guterres
The election of Guterres in 2018 and the appointment of Horst Kohler as his Personal Envoy breathed new life into the process and refocused the discussion on the need for a mutually acceptable political solution.
Since the adoption of Resolution 2440 in 2018, the Security Council put more emphasis on the need for all parties, including Algeria and Mauritania in addition to Morocco and the Polisario, to be guided by a spirit of compromise and realism, while stressing the need to “achieve a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution based on compromise.” The resolutions also regard Algeria as a main party to the conflict, stressing the pivotal role that it should play in the political process.
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that the new language in the UNSG report is a stark rebuke to Algeria and the Polisario. It also renews the call for them to forgo the pipe dream of establishing an independent state in southern Morocco and to approach the political process with good faith.
Samir Bennis is the co-founder of Morocco World News. You can follow him on Twitter @SamirBennis.
